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Abstract. This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when
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do both. Variable search and separation, ¯nite UI bene¯t duration, e±ciency wages,
and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-speci¯c
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surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.
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11 Introduction
A model of real business cycles with matching (RBCM) is a natural candidate for ex-
ploring many dynamic policy issues. Postulating a job matching function helps us give a
coherent analysis of unemployment and its response to labor market policies (see Roger-
son, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a recent survey of matching models). Moreover, Merz
(1995), Andolfatto (1996), and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) have claimed that
endogenizing unemployment by means of a matching function improves the ¯t of real
business cycle models. Thus it is tempting to use the RBCM framework to measure
the costs of business cycles or the purported bene¯ts of output stabilization, or to ask
whether unemployment bene¯ts should vary with the cycle, among other issues.
These questions interest us. But when we tried to build a model to address them, we
quickly encountered problems with the RBCM framework which existing literature had
not pointed out. For our purposes, we needed a model consistent both with business
cycle facts and with the e®ects of labor market policies. We found it easy to choose
parameters to make the cyclical variation in unemployment as large in the model as it is
in the data, or to make the response of unemployment to a change in the unemployment
insurance (UI) bene¯t as small in the model as it is in the data. But no calibration
permits the standard RBCM model to reproduce both these features: improving the ¯t
over the cycle makes the ¯t worse with respect to policy, and vice versa. Similar problems
occur with employment, vacancies, tightness, and the probability of job ¯nding.
These ¯ndings are related to a prominent recent controversy. Shimer (2004, 2005)
and Hall (2003, 2005A, 2005B) studied the cyclical dynamics of calibrated RBCM mod-
els and obtained °uctuations of unemployment and vacancies an order of magnitude
smaller than those in the data.1 The reason is that in their models, productivity shocks
cause strong wage movements that o®set the incentive to vary hiring, thus eliminat-
ing most °uctuations in unemployment and vacancies. As a corollary, they also found
that a model with sticky wages, instead of the more traditional Nash wage bargaining
framework, does a better job of reproducing labor market °uctuations.
While our observations are related to those of Shimer and Hall, we feel that an
important element is missing in their argument, because their claim that unemployment
is insu±ciently variable in the RBCM model is not true in general. In fact, it is speci¯c to
their particular calibration: Shimer and Hall both assume that workers' cost of working
is low compared to their productivity, so that the match surplus is large. When this
restriction is removed, it is easy to make unemployment volatile. If the surplus is small
1An early paper anticipating Shimer and Hall's results is Millard, Scott, and Sensier (1997).
2on average, then a small fall in labor productivity may eat up a large proportion of the
surplus, so that realistic productivity °uctuations generate arbitrarily high variability
in vacancies, unemployment, and tightness. Stated di®erently, if the cost of working
is acyclical, and is on average only slightly less than after-tax labor productivity, then
wages will be relatively rigid and pro¯ts and hiring incentives will be strongly procyclical.
The observation that employment is volatile in the RBCM model if the surplus is
small has been made again more recently by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) in a sharp
critique of Shimer and Hall's claims. However, our main point here is that such a cal-
ibration only creates another problem. The hiring margin is a®ected by productivity,
taxes, and workers' disutility costs and opportunity costs of labor. If we blow up the
impact of productivity by making the surplus small on average, then hiring becomes
extremely sensitive to taxes and labor market policies too. We demonstrate analytically
in a simple benchmark RBCM model that the responses of unemployment to produc-
tivity shocks and to policy variables cannot be simultaneously reconciled with the data.
We go on to show numerically that this problem remains when the model is extended
in several ways not considered by Shimer and Hall, and is also present but undiagnosed
in previous papers.
The recent survey of Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005A) concludes, like us,
that solving the unemployment °uctuation problem by making the surplus small is likely
to exaggerate the model's policy e®ects. However, while cyclical labor market dynamics
have been extensively documented in recent papers, the policy e®ects that underlie the
other half of our argument are more controversial. Therefore, we also perform a detailed
robustness analysis of the best-known cross-country policy regressions. We ¯nd that the
e®ects of UI bene¯ts and taxes are quite robustly identi¯ed by both cross-sectional and
time series evidence, and are approximately equal, as our model implies. Our estimates
are somewhat larger than those of Layard and Nickell (1999), and imply that bene¯ts
and taxes have economically important e®ects, but are much too small to be reconciled
with the cyclical volatility of unemployment in the standard RBCM model.
Finally, our paper also discusses two possible solutions of our \puzzle". Shimer
(2004) and Hall's (2005A,B) argument that sticky wages help by making ¯rms' share
of surplus more procyclical also helps resolve our puzzle, as long as wages eventually
adjust in the face of long run policy changes. However, we also identify a real mechanism
that can reconcile the cyclical and policy-related variation in unemployment. Embodied
(that is, match-speci¯c) technological change also increases the cyclicality of the match
surplus, especially for the ¯rm, without changing long run policy impacts. While we
focus on one particular puzzle for the RBCM model, and propose one new solution,
3several other recent papers make related points. Other empirical criticisms of the RBCM
model include Cole and Rogerson (1999), Fujita (2004), and Ravn (2006). Other papers
o®ering ways of improving the model's ¯t include Mortensen and Nagypal (2006), Silva
and Toledo (2005), and Hall and Milgrom (2005).
The next section states our general model. In section 3, we analytically calculate the
relationship between the cyclical variability of unemployment and the e®ects of UI on
unemployment in a tractable special case. In section 4, we brie°y discuss cyclical stylized
facts and then carefully study the robustness of cross-country evidence on policy e®ects,
concluding that these two sets of evidence jointly reject our baseline model. Section 5
shows that neither variable search, variable separation, ¯nite UI bene¯t duration, nor
e±ciency wages su±ce to make the model ¯t the data, but that sticky wages or match-
speci¯c productivity shocks might. In section 6, we discuss some earlier RBCM papers
that are not nested in our analysis (mainly because they allow for physical capital), and
show that they are subject to the same critique. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Our general model is a version of the standard RBCM model, as spelled out in Pissarides
(2000) and elsewhere. We simplify by ignoring physical capital; including it would be
likely to reinforce our \puzzle", since capital can more easily adjust to long term policy
changes than to short term business cycle °uctuations.2 In hopes of ¯nding a successful
version of the model, we generalize in several ways: we allow productivity to vary across
matches, and we allow separation rates and bargaining power to vary too.
2.1 Values and surpluses
Let Z be a shock to the productivity of the economy, and let z be the value of this shock
at the time when a given job was formed. We consider a labor productivity process y
that allows the output of a match to depend on its vintage:
y(z;Z) = 1 + ®ZZ + ³(1 ¡ ®Z)z (1)
In the usual RBC speci¯cation (®Z = 1), aggregate productivity °uctuates because tech-
nology shocks immediately a®ect all matches. But alternatively, technological progress
2See Sec. 6. We also simplify by ignoring two other generalizations that are unlikely to resolve
the dilemma at hand. One might want to consider procyclical labor market distortions (since both
UI bene¯ts and taxes are typically increasing in the wage) or procyclical hiring costs (since the cost
of hiring may consist mostly of labor time). However, these factors would only make ¯rms' hiring
expenditure less procyclical, so they are not likely to help resolve the puzzle that concerns us.
4could require the creation of new jobs. In that case, productivity would have a match-
speci¯c or cohort-speci¯c component, which would be consistent with Devereux's (2003)
evidence that workers tend to ¯nd persistently better matches in booms. Setting ®Z = 0
attributes all °uctuations in aggregate productivity to this cohort-speci¯c component.
The parameter ³ allows us to adjust the impact of the match-speci¯c shock z relative
to the aggregate shock Z.
It is well known that in matching models without a capital stock, surpluses and
most decision variables are independent of the unemployment rate. Without mentioning
unemployment, we can write transition probabilities in terms of labor market tightness,
which in turn depends on productivity. To save on notation, we immediately impose
these restrictions by writing the value and policy functions in terms of their appropriate
state variables. Later we point out why these restrictions are valid.
If the after-tax wage is w(z;Z), then an employed worker's value, W E(z;Z), is:
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We generalize to allow the separation rate ± to depend on productivity. We will see that
the probability of ¯nding a job can be written as p(S;µ), where S is search e®ort and µ















Here b represents the UI bene¯t, though in general it should also be understood to
capture other costs of working, such as disutility costs. S is the intensity of job search
and h(S) are the costs of searching. Most of the time we will ¯x S = 1 and h(S) = 0,
but we will also investigate the e®ect of varying search intensity.
The workers' surplus is de¯ned as the di®erence between the values of employment

























The value to the ¯rm of a ¯lled job, J(z;Z), satis¯es the recursive equation
J(z;Z) = §
F(z;Z) = y(z;Z) ¡ w(z;Z) ¡ ¿ + ¯(1 ¡ ±(z;Z))EZ0jZJ(z;Z
0) (6)
5where ¿ represents total labor taxes on the worker and the ¯rm. Unlike a worker's job
acceptance decision, ¯lling a job is assumed (as usual) to have no opportunity cost in
terms of lost hiring opportunities, so that the surplus §F(z;Z) associated with a ¯lled
job is the same as the value of that job. In other words, ¯rms o®er new jobs until the
expected pro¯ts associated with a vacancy are zero. If the probability of a ¯lling a job






where · is the °ow cost of maintaining a vacancy.







Here we generalize again, by letting bargaining power ¹ vary with the aggregate state.
2.2 The labor market




where V is total vacancies, and U is unemployment. Tightness is de¯ned as µ ´ V=U
so that it depends on unemployment U rather than e®ective search US, which is unob-















Equ. (10) implicitly provides a metric for search e®ort, saying that the individual prob-
ability of ¯nding a job is proportional to search.
Note that equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (11) are seven equations that
determine the seven functions §W(z;Z), S(Z), §F(z;Z), µ(Z), w(z;Z), p(S;µ), and
pF(S;µ), without reference to unemployment U. Thus it is reasonable to look for a
solution of these equations that is independent of U.
As we de¯ne the labor market dynamics of our model, we must note that ®Z < 1
implies a distribution of match productivities. To deal with this e®ect in the simplest
possible way, in Section 4 where we allow ®Z < 1 we will assume that productivity
6follows a two-state Markov process, taking a low value ZLO or a high value ZHI. We
then distinguish between the fraction of the labor force in matches with low productivity,
NLO
t , and the fraction matched with high productivity, NHI
t . Total employment plus
unemployment must sum to one:




t + Ut = 1 (12)
If we write total matches at time t as Mt ´ °µ(Zt)1¡¸S(Zt)Ut, then the three labor
market state variables follow the dynamics
N
HI
t+1 = (1 ¡ ±(Z
HI;Zt))N
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LO;Zt))N
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t ¡ Mt + Ut (15)
where 1(x) is an indicator function equalling 1 if statement x is true, and 0 if x is false.
Here we see that total job destruction is Dt = ±(ZHI;Zt)NHI
t + ±(ZLO;Zt)NLO
t .
Finally, given that there is no capital stock, aggregate output Qt is:







3 Unemployment volatility: cycles and policies
We now consider the simplest and most standard version of this model, in which pro-
ductivity is disembodied (y = 1 + Z), and the separation rate ± and bargaining power
¹ are constant.3 For this special case, we can characterize the dynamics explicitly, and
calculate how the cyclical variability of labor market aggregates relates to their response
to UI policy.
De¯ne total surplus as §t ´ §F
t + §W
t . Summing equations (4) and (6), and using
the fact that the worker's share of surplus is ¹, we see that § must satisfy
§t = yt ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h(St) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)Et§
F
t+1 + ¯(1 ¡ ± ¡ pt)Et§
W
t+1
= yt ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h(St) + ¯(1 ¡ ± ¡ ¹pt)Et§t+1 (17)
where h(S) = 0 if search is exogenous. We already see that productivity, UI bene¯ts,
and labor taxes will a®ect match surplus in closely related ways, which is the key to our
results. In addition, we have the zero pro¯t condition
· = p
F
t EtJt+1 = p
F
t (1 ¡ ¹)Et§t+1 (18)
3To simplify notation, we now use the time subscript t to denote dependence on the aggregate state
Zt (and also on Ut where appropriate).





t depend only on tightness µt
and search e®ort St. Thus when search is exogenous, (17) and (18) su±ce to determine
total surplus §t and tightness µt.
In the endogenous search case, the ¯rst-order condition (5) plus the zero pro¯t con-







Since h(S) is convex, (18) implies a positive relation S(µ) between search and tightness:
people search harder when jobs are easier to ¯nd. We write the elasticity of S as
´S
µ (µ) ´ (1 + h00(S(µ))S(µ)=h0(S(µ)))¡1. In what follows, we will assume that search
costs h(S) are small on average, but are su±ciently convex so that job ¯nding responds
relatively inelastically to µ. This guarantees existence of a unique equilibrium, and as we
will see shortly, large search costs or highly elastic search e®ort would have counterfactual
implications.
Steady state
In the nonstochastic steady state (indicated by dropping the subscript t), equations (17)





y ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h(S)
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ± ¡ ¹°Sµ1¡¸)
(20)
If S is exogenous, then the left-hand side is increasing in µ, and the right-hand side
is decreasing in µ, so there exists a unique steady state for µ and §. In the case of
endogenous search, we assume S is su±ciently inelastic so that the same conclusions
hold. In particular, we assume the left side of (20) is increasing in µ, which requires:
¸
¤ ´ ¸ ¡ ´
S
µ (µ) > 0 (21)
We can use (20) to derive the comparative statics of µ in terms of UI and taxes. To
keep the results unit-free, it will be helpful to do our calculations in terms of the unitless
variable » ´ b=y, which we will call the \replacement ratio", though more precisely it is
the steady state ratio of UI bene¯ts to labor productivity.4 Likewise, we will calculate
4In steady state, the di®erence between our \replacement ratio" » ´ b=y and the true UI replacement
ratio b=w is small; we have veri¯ed numerically that the quantitative impact of using b=y instead of
b=w is trivial.
8the e®ects of taxes in terms of the unitless variable ¿=y, which we call the \tax wedge".
Now, let hats represent changes in the log of the steady state. (20) implies:
¸^ µ¡^ S = ¡
b














S(S) ´ h0(S)S=h(S). We simplify, using (20) again, and writing the equations
in terms of ^ p = (1¡¸¤)^ µ. Then the elasticity of the job ¯nding probability with respect
to the replacement ratio, ´
p








y ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h
¶µ
1 ¡ ¯ + ¯± + ¯¹p






The steady state e®ect of the replacement ratio on unemployment is approximately
the opposite of its e®ect on the job ¯nding probability p. In steady state, unemployment






= ¡(1 ¡ U)
^ p
^ »
= ¡(1 ¡ U)´
p
» > 0 (24)
Equations (23) and (24) show that ¸¤ > 0 is necessary for UI to a®ect unemployment
positively, as observed in the data; this justi¯es assumption (21).
Dynamics
Now consider the dynamics. Suppose that yt = 1 + Zt is AR1 in logs:
~ yt+1 = ½~ yt + ²t+1 (25)
where ² is i.i.d. with Et²t+1 = 0, and ½ 2 (0;1). (Now tildes signify log deviations
from steady state, and unadorned variables are steady state values or constants.) If
we linearize the surplus dynamics (17) and the zero pro¯t condition (18) and impose
saddle path stability, we ¯nd an explicit formula for the dynamics of the job-¯nding








y ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h
¶µ
1 ¡ ¯ + ¯± + ¯¹p





The close resemblance between (23) and (26) will help us test the model. Intuitively,
the model says that a permanent increase in UI or taxes should have exactly the same
e®ect on the surplus process, and therefore on hiring, as a permanent decrease in pro-
ductivity by the same amount. Since equivalent changes in b, ¿, and y mean changes
9by the same absolute amount (instead of equal percentage changes), the clearest way to
express our results will be in terms of semielasticities (instead of elasticities).5 Writing





can use (23) and (26) to obtain:
Proposition 1. The dynamic elasticity of the probability of job ¯nding with
respect to productivity, and the long-run semielasticity of the probability
of job ¯nding with respect to the replacement ratio », have the following

















1 ¡ ¯ + ¯± + ¯¹p=¸¤ ¡ h´h
S´S
µ =(¸¤§)





This ratio equals one if and only if ½ = 1, and is strictly less than one if ½ < 1.
That is, a permanent increase in labor productivity has the same e®ect on hiring as a
permanent decrease in UI bene¯ts by the same absolute amount, while a temporary rise
in labor productivity would have a smaller impact. Endogenous search leaves this ratio
unchanged if ½ = 1, and makes it smaller if ½ < 1, because the search term h´h
S´S
µ =(¸¤§)
decreases the numerator proportionally more than the denominator. Also, it is easy to
verify that exactly the same formula can be derived if we replace ´
p
» by the semielasticity
of job ¯nding with respect to the tax wedge.
For comparison with the data it is helpful to translate Prop. 1 into a statement about
unemployment. Turning to the dynamics of U, we have:
Ut+1 = Ut + ±(1 ¡ Ut) ¡ °Stµ
1¡¸
t Ut (28)
In the appendix we calculate the ratio of the standard deviations of the logs (the usual
business cycle volatility measure) of unemployment and the technology shock, which we
can then compare to the semielasticity ²U
» ´ @ logU=@» of unemployment with respect
to the replacement ratio. Using the notation ¾x ´
p
Var(~ xt), we obtain:
Proposition 2. The relative standard deviation of log unemployment to log
output, and the long-run semielasticity of unemployment with respect to
























±(U + ½(U ¡ ±))





5Another crucial reason to state our results in terms of semielasticities is that our model's b should
actually be interpreted as the sum of the UI bene¯t (observed) and the disutility of working (unob-
served). The semielasticity of unemployment with respect to the total cost of working b is the same as
the semielasticity with respect to observed UI bene¯ts. In contrast, the elasticity with respect to b can-
not be directly estimated without assumptions about the size of the unobserved disutility component.
10The left side of Prop. 2 is easily observable. The relative volatility ¾U=¾Q can be
calculated from standard macroeconomic data; and following Layard and Nickell (1999),
we will regress log unemployment on the replacement ratio across countries to estimate
²U
» . On the right side, the ¯rst term is strictly less than one unless technology shocks are
permanent. The second term is less than or equal to one if U > ±, which is true if and
only if ± + p < 1. Thus this restriction is satis¯ed unless we choose an inappropriately
long period (a Cobb-Douglas matching model like this is not well behaved if periods
are so long that transition probabilities are near one). The last term is less than one in
the data, and it cannot exceed one in our model except in the irrelevant case of a large
positive correlation between y and U. Thus for any sensible parameters, all three terms
on the right hand side are weakly less than one, strictly so in the case of the last term.6
4 Empirical evidence
We have shown that the RBCM framework implies a tight relationship between cyclical
and policy-related variation in unemployment and other labor market variables. Next,
we brie°y discuss labor market °uctuations (which have been extensively reviewed else-
where recently), and then explore the e®ects of labor market policies in greater detail.
4.1 Unemployment over the business cycle
For evidence on cyclical °uctuations, we consider US data from 1951:1 to 2006:2 from
the St. Louis Fed's FRED database, either using quarterly series, or monthly series
aggregated to quarterly frequency. We use series GDPC1 for our measure of real out-
put, UNEMPLOY for the number of unemployed workers, the advertising index HELP-
WANT for vacancies, and UEMPMED for median unemployment duration. All series
discussed below are seasonally adjusted, logged, and detrended with the HP ¯lter, un-
less otherwise speci¯ed. Following Shimer (2005), we set the HP smoothing parameter
to 100000, because otherwise the implied HP unemployment trend comoves strongly
with the NBER-identi¯ed business cycle. Thus, let ¾X denote the standard deviation
of the HP cyclical component of the log of variable X. In our sample, the volatility
of log GDP, Q, is ¾Q = 0:0252. By contrast, log unemployment U °uctuates almost
6We should emphasize that this result is independent of the mean unemployment rate U. In the
numerator, ¾U is approximately the standard deviation of unemployment divided by U. In the denom-
inator, ²U
» ¼ U¡1@U=@». So U¡1 cancels, meaning our results do not depend on how we calibrate mean
U, and also do not depend on using logs rather than levels of U.
11eight times as much: ¾U = 0:1933, giving the ratio ¾U=¾Q = 7:66.7 Similarly, the log of
the median unemployment spell duration has a standard deviation of 0.1732 after HP
¯ltering. Vacancies V are also highly volatile: ¾V = 0:1974.
Another striking labor market fact is the robust negative correlation between the
cyclical components of log unemployment and log vacancies, -0.884 in our data. Given
this correlation, the tightness ratio µ = V=U is even more volatile than the two series
separately: ¾µ = 0:3736. By contrast, employment N, wages w, and labor productivity
y are even smoother than GDP: ¾N = 0:0137, ¾w = 0:0140, and ¾y = 0:0164 using
FRED series CE16OV, COMPRNFB, and OPHNFB.
The key point here is the high volatility of unemployment (and vacancies and tight-
ness) relative to its own mean.8 This robust ¯nding has been discussed in many other
studies; see for example Merz (1995), Cole and Rogerson (1999), and Greenwood, Gomes,
and Rebelo (2001) for similar second moments. Shimer (2005) reports that workers' job
¯nding probability p is also volatile, with ¾p = 0:118.
4.2 Literature on labor market policy and unemployment
Our paper's implications for labor market policy e®ects are general equilibrium pre-
dictions, like its implications for business cycles. To test these predictions we need to
see whether di®erent labor market policies lead to aggregate changes in unemployment
and vacancies. One way to do this is to use time series data on the e®ects of policy in
a single country. Since large policy changes are relatively rare, this strategy typically
involves case studies of major reforms that act as \natural experiments".9 Unfortu-
nately, such studies are few and far between, and their reliance on unique events makes
them hard to interpret. Another possibility which might seem useful would be to study
microeconomic data on how di®erent policy treatments a®ect individual labor market
outcomes. Studies of this sort are plentiful but are not directly relevant since they only
identify the partial equilibrium e®ect of policy on workers' choices. Layard, Nickell, and
Jackman's (1991) survey argues that the consensus range of estimates for the elasticity
7Setting the HP smoothing parameter to 1600 only strengthens our results, raising ¾U=¾Q to 7.87,
because lowering the parameter decreases ¾Q more than ¾U.
8It is quantitatively unimportant whether we make this point in terms of the log of the number un-
employed, the log of the unemployment rate, or the mean and standard deviation of the unemployment
rate. Studying the log or the coe±cient of variation of unemployment might seem strange to those
accustomed to frictionless models where unemployment is just a residual. But the log-linear matching
technology in the RBCM framework places strong restrictions on the °uctuation of unemployment,
relative to its mean, which are central to calibrating the model.
9See for example Solon (1985), Hunt (1995), and Bennmarker, Carling, and Holmlund (2005).
12of unemployment duration with respect to UI bene¯ts is 0.2 to 0.9; this is only relevant
for us insofar as it is smaller than the general equilibrium estimates we discuss below.
Thus, by process of elimination, we believe that the best evidence on these issues
comes from international cross-sectional or panel-data studies. Adequate data for this
purpose have been compiled by the OECD for many of its member countries, often
going back to 1960. Layard et. al. (1991) used these data to calculate the impact of
unemployment bene¯ts and other labor market policy variables; they have updated their
estimates with expanded data several times. For purposes of comparison, we will take as
our benchmark the methodology and estimates of Layard and Nickell (1999, henceforth
LN99), who ¯nd that the semielasticity of unemployment with respect to the UI bene¯t
replacement ratio is 1.3, with a standard error of 0.5.10 Similar results, for related data
sets, are reported by Scarpetta (1996) and Disney (2000). While some studies have
argued that the e®ects of UI are smaller (Baker et. al. (2003) claim that the UI e®ects
in OECD data are not signi¯cant), the largest cross-country estimates of UI e®ects we
know of are not much bigger than those of LN99.
Some recent studies are more ambitious, addressing higher-frequency data and at-
tempting to identify interaction terms. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) study how insti-
tutions interact with shocks; Belot and van Ours (2004) interact di®erent institutions;
Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) use annual data to identify both institutional in-
teractions and country-speci¯c trends. Baker et. al. (2003, 2004) provide an excellent
overview and critique of these and other recent studies (Elmeskov et. al. 1998; Fitoussi
et. al. 2000; Bertola et. al. 2001). While these papers' estimates vary widely, the im-
portant point for our purposes is that none of them ¯nd substantially larger e®ects of
unemployment bene¯ts than those we estimate.11
4.3 Possible problems with cross-country estimates
Cross-country regressions to measure the impact of policy are frequently criticized,12
and concern is justi¯able on at least three grounds. First, the number of countries and
periods is inevitably rather small, and data on institutions and policy variables may
10LN99 regress log unemployment on the replacement rate and other labor market policies and
controls for 20 OECD countries. They run GLS in order to allow for random country e®ects, treating
1983-88 and 1989-94 averages as separate observations, and including a time dummy for 1989-94.
11The largest estimate obtained in these papers is that of Elmeskov et. al. (1998), who ¯nd that a
10 percentage point rise in the replacement ratio would raise unemployment by 1.29 percentage points.
See the summary table on p. 36 of Baker et. al. (2003).
12E.g. Levine and Renelt (1992) and Durlauf and Quah (1999) in the growth literature. Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2006) reject out of hand the use of cross-country data to evaluate policy e®ects.
13be of poor quality. More precisely, since each country has its own statistical agency,
data de¯nitions may di®er, and variables may be missing for some countries or periods.
A second, related point is that a fully structural estimate of the impact of policy and
institutions would probably require additional variables on which no data exist at all.
Therefore, cross-country studies estimate reduced form relationships, leaving reasonable
doubts about robustness to econometric variations. Third, results may be biased due to
endogeneity problems. Rather than identifying the e®ects of policy on unemployment,
regressions could capture reverse causation from unemployment to changes in policy.
The purpose of our empirical work is to investigate how the results of LN99 and related
papers hold up in the face of these three lines of criticism.
The issues of data inconsistency between countries, and possibly omitted time se-
ries or cross-sectional regressors, make it essential to check how results change when we
control for time e®ects and country e®ects. For institutional variables such as unemploy-
ment bene¯ts and labor tax wedges, changes over time within a country are probably
better measured than di®erences across countries. If we ¯nd similar results along the
time series dimension and along the cross-sectional dimension, this suggests that it is
not just poor data quality which drives the results. Moreover, given our robustness
concerns, we control for country and time e®ects in several ways: we try ¯xed e®ects,
random e®ects, and cluster corrections for the cross-sectional dimension, and both ¯xed
e®ects and macroeconomic control variables in the time dimension.
Many further aspects of our estimation strategy help mitigate our remaining con-
cerns. We use a much longer time sample than LN99, and we compare regressions for
two di®erent data sets. We also run a wide variety of speci¯cations, studying di®erent
sample periods, exclusion of possible outliers, and the exclusion of di®erent combina-
tions of regressors. Also, we exploit the fact that in our model, the coe±cient of interest
can be estimated from taxes, or from bene¯ts, or from their sum. As for the endogene-
ity problem, the main concern is that countries with persistently high unemployment
could be forced, for budgetary reasons, to lower bene¯ts and raise taxes. We check for
endogeneity by regressing unemployment on lagged policies instead of contemporane-
ous policies. Moreover, since budgetary pressures tend to push bene¯ts and taxes in
opposite directions, the coe±cient on their sum ¿ + b is less likely to su®er endogeneity
bias than those on taxes and bene¯ts separately. This is another good reason to focus
on the sum. We ¯nd no evidence that endogeneity biasses our results, and our main
¯ndings turn out to be distinctly robust. Especially when we look at the total labor
supply distortion ¿ + b, we repeatedly obtain a semi-elasticity of about 2.
144.4 Impact of bene¯ts and taxes on unemployment
We now run a variety of cross-country regressions to estimate the e®ect of the UI re-
placement ratio and the tax rate on log unemployment. We base our regressions on
those of Layard and Nickell (1999). Like them, we try to avoid complex time series
methods by aggregating the data to a lower frequency: we average all variables over ¯ve
year periods before estimation. But we extend their results in several ways. First, by
studying a long sample, from 1960 to 1999, we show that the cross-sectional and the
time series variation in our data both provide similar evidence on policy e®ects. Second,
we run many robustness checks, especially in relation to the sample period and possible
outliers. Third, we test and then impose our model's restriction that the coe±cients on
taxes and bene¯ts should be equal, thus improving the stability of our estimates.
We use two data sources: the Labor Market Institutions Database of Nickell and
Nunziata (2001), and an expansion of this dataset, extended to 1999 and including
more series, constructed by the IMF and by Baker et. al., (2003). Except where other-
wise noted, the results are based on the latter. The dependent variable is the log of the
¯ve-year average of the unemployment rate. The regressors include either the tax wedge
and the UI bene¯t replacement ratio separately, or the sum of the two. We usually
also include indices of bene¯t duration, employment protection, union density, and bar-
gaining coordination, and the percent of households who are owner-occupiers. However,
the coe±cients of interest are those on bene¯ts and taxes, since our propositions show
that these bear a direct relation to the e®ects of productivity shocks. Some regressions
also include an active labor market policy index (ALMP), or the cross-country mean of
the output gap. Data sources and de¯nitions are described in Appendix 2, which also
provides the address of a web page where our data can be downloaded.
Our benchmark estimates are reported in Table 1. When possible, we use the same
variables as LN99, scaling them all (except bene¯t duration, which is de¯ned di®erently
in LN99) to make our coe±cients directly comparable to those reported in their Table
15. The ¯rst two columns show OLS estimates without country or time dummies, but
with robust standard errors based on a cluster correction by country; the estimated
coe±cients on the tax wedge (semielasticity 4.21) and UI bene¯ts (semielasticity 1.70)
are both moderately larger than those reported in LN99. The remaining columns con-
trol for country e®ects or time e®ects in a variety of ways; column 7 shows the LN99
speci¯cation, which is a GLS regression with random country e®ects and ¯xed time
e®ects. As in LN99, bargaining coordination has a negative e®ect on unemployment,
sometimes signi¯cant; and the percentage of households which are owner occupiers has
a signi¯cant positive e®ect on unemployment, which makes sense if countries with more
15rental housing attain greater labor market °exibility. One notable di®erence between
our benchmark estimates and LN99 is that we do not ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of bene¯t
duration, employment protection, or union density.
As we mentioned in Sec. 3, our matching framework implies that the semielasticities
of unemployment with respect to the tax wedge and the UI bene¯t should be roughly
equal. When we test this prediction in our data, we ¯nd a signi¯cant di®erence (at the
5% level) between the coe±cients on taxes and bene¯ts in only one of the ¯ve speci¯ca-
tions considered in Table 1. Therefore it is also interesting to impose the restriction that
the coe±cients are equal, by regressing on the sum of the tax wedge and the replacement
ratio. When we do so (even-numbered columns of Table 1), we obtain a notably more
stable coe±cient: the estimated semielasticity with respect to the sum ¿ +b ranges from
1.33 (running GLS with random country e®ects and ¯xed time e®ects) to 2.45 (without
controls for country or time e®ects). Four of the ¯ve coe±cients are signi¯cant at 1%,
and all of them at 10%. Thus these estimates strongly suggest that the semielasticity
that interests us is approximately two.
Regressing on taxes and bene¯ts separately while controlling both for unobserved
country-speci¯c and time-speci¯c factors requires us to estimate a large number of coef-
¯cients relative to the modest amount of data available. This implies less stable results,
as in column 7 of Table 1, where the tax coe±cient falls to zero. Nonetheless, our
reading of Table 1 and also Table 2, which reports the coe±cient on ¿ + b for many
alternative speci¯cations, is that there is strong cross-sectional and time series evidence
for a semielasticity of approximately two. Moderately larger e®ects are found in the
country e®ects regressions13 (i.e. in within-country time series variation in the data)
than in the time e®ects regressions14, but the coe±cients are similar. Moreover, when
we take advantage of the greater stability implied by regressing on the sum ¿ + b, we
obtain a robustly signi¯cant semielasticity, around 1.5, even if we allow for time e®ects
and country e®ects simultaneously (columns 5 and 8 of Table 2). Finally, we also try
to economize on coe±cients by regressing on the cross-country mean of the output gap
instead of including time dummies.15 As expected, the coe±cient on the output gap is
negative and usually highly signi¯cant; taxes, bene¯ts, and taxes plus bene¯ts all tend
13Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 and columns 4 and 7 of Table 2. We never ¯nd systematic di®erences
between ¯xed and random e®ects.
14Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 and column 2 of Table 2; standard errors are cluster-corrected across
countries in these regressions.
15The tables report results using the unweighted cross-country mean of the output gap. If we instead
use a weighted mean, with weights corresponding to the size of the labor force, results are similar.
16to have robust, signi¯cant coe±cients, around two, in speci¯cations where the mean
output gap is used instead of time e®ects.
Table 2 considers many additional robustness issues. The regressors are the same
ones listed in Table 1, unless otherwise stated, but only the coe±cient on taxes plus
bene¯ts is shown. First, we try eliminating the pre-1975 data, which may be less reli-
able. The coe±cient on ¿ +b decreases somewhat; the most interesting e®ect (not in the
table) is that bene¯t duration usually has a signi¯cant positive coe±cient in post-1975
estimates. Splitting the sample at 1980 or 1985 yields similar results; the coe±cient on
¿+b is larger but less signi¯cant in the early subsample, and smaller in the later subsam-
ple, where much of the impact of bene¯ts is instead picked up by duration. In row 3, we
replace the BGHS data (available to 1999) with the LMIDB dataset (available to 1995);
the coe±cient on ¿ + b decreases moderately unless both time and country dummies
are included, which makes it insigni¯cant. Next, we try excluding Scandinavia, where
unemployment rates have remained generally low in spite of large bene¯t increases over
our sample period, perhaps due to generous spending on reemployment and retraining
policies. A nontrivial increase in the coe±cient on ¿ + b is observed, to around 3.5. As
an alternative control for this type of social spending, row 5 reports regressions that
include an indicator of spending on \active labor market policies" (ALMP); this series
is limited to 1985-99 and requires an instrumental variables treatment, as in LN99. The
coe±cient falls to around 1.5 (but is higher than in a 1980-95 regression without ALMP).
In the last two rows of results, we check how the other regressors a®ect the coe±cient on
¿ + b. Eliminating employment protection, union density, and bene¯t duration, which
are insigni¯cant in the full 1960-99 sample, has little e®ect on the estimates; eliminating
bargaining coordination and the owner occupancy rate (which are usually signi¯cant)
tends to decrease the coe±cient and its signi¯cance.
The possible endogeneity of policy is addressed in Table 2, row 6, and also in Table
3, where we regress unemployment on lagged policies.16 The issue is that high unem-
ployment could worsen the government's ¯nances and force it to raise taxes (or lower
bene¯ts), biassing down the coe±cient on taxes (and biassing up that on bene¯ts). The
e®ects of taxes and bene¯ts appear slightly more stable in Table 3, with lagged policies,
than in the otherwise identical regressions of Table 1. In fact, the insigni¯cant negative
tax e®ect found in column 7 of Table 1 might be due to endogeneity; this coe±cient
becomes positive and signi¯cant in Table 3. Nonetheless, comparing Tables 1 and 3
shows that including lagged rather than current policy can either increase or decrease
16That is, we regress the log of the mean of the unemployment rate from t to t + 4 on the mean of
each policy variable from t ¡ 1 to t ¡ 5.
17the coe±cient on taxes, and likewise that on bene¯ts, so the evidence for endogeneity
is weak. Also, as we mentioned earlier, an endogeneity problem is less likely when we
regress on the sum ¿ + b instead of on taxes and bene¯ts separately. Comparing the
third rows of Tables 1 and 3, or rows 1 and 6 of Table 2, we ¯nd that the coe±cient on
¿ + b is virtually unchanged by using lagged rather than current policy.
In summary, our estimate of the semielasticity of unemployment with respect to
bene¯ts is somewhat larger than LN99 found: two instead of 1.3. Our higher estimate
probably results partly from the e®ect of taxes, which tend to have an (insigni¯cantly)
higher coe±cient than UI bene¯ts when the two are treated separately. Also, LN99
used data from 1984 onwards, and in this period an important part of the impact on
unemployment is attributed to bene¯t duration rather than to bene¯t levels per se.
Third, LN99 ran a GLS regression with random country e®ects and ¯xed time e®ects,
which in our estimates yields a lower coe±cient. However, while our results imply that
the impact of UI bene¯ts is economically important, it is still far too small to reconcile
our model with business cycle data. In our model, the ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» between the
relative cyclical volatility of unemployment and the semielasticity of unemployment to
UI bene¯ts should be substantially less than one. But in our data, (¾U=¾Q) is over
seven, and ²U
» is around two. The standard errors on our policy estimates are not even
close to su±cient to reconcile these observations with Proposition 2.
5 Variations on the standard model
The version of our model that we characterized analytically in Sec. 3 is strongly rejected
by the data we just reviewed. Tinkering with parameters will not help, since the upper
bound in Prop. 2 is independent of calibration. However, some generalization of the
model might ¯t better, so we turn next to numerical simulations of the general model
from Sec. 2. Our ¯rst calibration is chosen to match our estimate of the semielasticity
of unemployment with respect to UI bene¯ts, ²U
» ¼ 2.
5.1 Benchmark parameters
Our benchmark numerical calibration is as follows. All matches have equal productivity
(®Z = 1). The productivity shock Z follows a two-state Markov process, taking values
ZLO = ¡0:018 and ZHI = 0:018, and remaining unchanged from one period to the next
with probability ½Z. We simulate the model at weekly frequency, but report results
aggregated to quarterly frequency. We impose an approximate yearly persistence of
18¹ ½Z ´ 2=3, implying business cycles lasting roughly six years, by assuming that Z remains
unchanged from one week to the next with probability ½Z ´ ¹ ½
1=52
Z ¼ 0:9922.
Search intensity is exogenous: S = 1, h = 0 and ´h
S = 1. The elasticity of total
matches to unemployment is ¸ = 0:5, consistent with Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
We assume an e±cient benchmark equilibrium, setting ¹ = 0:5 (Hosios 1990). We
calibrate an annual job loss rate of approximately ¹ ± ´ 25% by setting the weekly proba-
bility of job loss to ± ´ ¹ ±=52. This is reasonable for the US, though separation rates are
higher for the least stable classes of jobs and workers. To get an annual discount factor
of ¹ ¯ ´ 95%, we set the weekly discount factor to ¯ ´ ¹ ¯1=52. The matching e±ciency
and vacancy cost parameters ° and · are reset in each simulation so that steady state
unemployment is always U = 0:06 (again, a US calibration) and so that a vacancy lasts
two weeks on average. Vacancy duration is just a normalization: doubling it would
mean doubling vacancies, reducing · by half, and adjusting ° to keep total matches,
total vacancy costs, and job ¯nding probabilities unchanged.
On average, the Markov process spends equal time in good and bad states, so mean
productivity y is 1. We set b = 0:745 and ¿ = 0 in our benchmark calibration: the cost of
working is 74.5% of mean labor productivity, and there are no taxes. These parameters
are crucial, because a higher b or ¿ implies a smaller and more variable surplus, making
unemployment and vacancies more volatile. In fact, (26) shows that the variance of job
¯nding goes to in¯nity as b + ¿ approaches y + h: clearly, the RBCM model cannot
be rejected on grounds of insu±cient unemployment volatility alone. Setting b = 0:745
implies ²U
» = 2, consistent with our estimates. We set ¿ = 0 for comparison with related
studies, but all the e®ects we obtain by changing b are also implied by changes in ¿.
Shimer (2005) instead calibrates b = 0:4, which implies, roughly speaking, that the only
cost of working is the loss of the UI bene¯t. But considering our model, b also includes
the utility costs (or any other costs) of working, which are presumably nontrivial.
Benchmark results: importance of the size of the of surplus
Table 4 shows the simulation results, with the numerical benchmark calibration in line
1. All relative standard deviations and correlations refer to data aggregated to quarterly
frequency, and results are HP-¯ltered with smoothing parameter 100000.17
By construction, the long run semielasticity of unemployment with respect to the
replacement ratio is ²U
» = 2:00 in our numerical benchmark. But this calibration yields
17The ¯lter has a moderate e®ect on the absolute level of °uctuations ¾Q, but has virtually no e®ect
on the relative °uctuations ¾U=¾Q, which are our focus. The ratio ¾U=¾Q only changes from 1.40
(with ¯ltering) to 1.42 (without). HP ¯ltering would become slightly more relevant if we chose a higher
persistence parameter ¹ ½Z.
19insu±cient cyclical variation in log unemployment, with ¾U=¾Q = 1:40, when this ratio
is over seven in the data. The punchline is that (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» equals 0.70, far too low for
consistency with the data, and also well below our analytical upper bound of one. Similar
results hold for the job ¯nding probability p: its cyclical variability is ¾p=¾Q = 1:61 (too
low), while the semielasticity ²
p
» is ¡2:13 (about right; not shown in table). The cyclical
variability of vacancies ¾V=¾Q = 3:23 is also too low.
As we mentioned above, a higher b can increase unemployment variability, by making
the surplus smaller and proportionally more volatile. With the benchmark value b =
0:745, total surplus § is 45.2% of the mean quarterly output of a matched worker. In line
2 we set b = 0:955 (95.5% of mean y), which is the cost of working assumed by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2006). This shrinks the surplus § to just 8.0% of mean quarterly labor
productivity. The relative volatility of unemployment rises to ¾U=¾Q = 5:71, almost
as high as in US data. However, unemployment also becomes more responsive to UI
bene¯ts, with ²U
» = 14:29, which drastically exceeds our estimates. Intuitively, such a
large b means ¯rms own a highly leveraged claim on the productivity process y, so that
small variations in y or b motivate big changes in hiring.
In line 2, we go in the opposite direction and decrease b to 0.4, as in Shimer (2005).18
Total surplus § is now 106.3% of mean quarterly labor productivity. The unemploy-
ment semielasticity ²U
» falls to 0.82, and the cyclical volatility of unemployment falls to
¾U=¾Q = 0:62. Thus this calibration not only produces insu±cient cyclical volatility:
it is even too inelastic to match the estimated impact of UI. Thus we see the main
tradeo®: we can make the model more volatile to better match cyclical data, or less
volatile to better match labor market data, but the two goals are at odds with each
other. In relative terms, the tradeo® is worse when b is large: (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» = 0:40 on
line 2, compared with (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» = 0:76 on line 3.
Before moving to other model speci¯cations, we study the e®ects of several other
parameters. In line 4, we set ¹ ½Z = 75%, increasing the length of a full cycle to roughly
eight years. In line 5, we increase the separation rate to ¹ ± = 40% annually, a reasonable
US calibration if we prefer to focus on relatively unstable jobs and workers. Line 6 lowers
the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment to ¸ = 0:3, while maintaining
¹ = 0:5; and line 7 lowers ¹ to 0.3, with ¸ = 0:5. While there are mild changes in some
statistics, the ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» is robust, staying close to 0.7 in all these experiments.
18Hall (2005B) sets b even lower, to 35% of the ¯rm's °ow of surplus in a new match.
205.2 Variable separation and variable search
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) argue that job destruction is strongly counter-
cyclical. Therefore, we need to ask whether variation in separation rates might change
our results. The usual model of variable separation (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994)
posits a match-speci¯c productivity shock, so that workers and ¯rms separate when their
joint surplus becomes negative. For simplicity, we instead assume an exogenous separa-
tion rate that depends negatively on the aggregate technology shock, which is essentially
what Mortensen and Pissarides' model implies. We set ¹ ±(ZLO) = 0:25 ¤ 1:15 = 0:2875
and ¹ ±(ZHI) = 0:25=1:15 ¼ 0:2174, so that ¹ ± varies with Z by §15%. Line 8 shows
that this brings the cyclicality of unemployment closer to the data: ¾U=¾Q rises to 5.89.
The semielasticity of unemployment with respect to » changes only slightly, so the ratio
(¾U=¾Q)=²U
» improves, rising to 2.79.
The problem is that this way of resolving the con°ict destroys the Beveridge curve:
the correlation between unemployment and vacancies switches sign to ½U;V = 0:95. The
fact that variable separation helps increase unemployment volatility, but eliminates the
Beveridge curve, has also been noted by Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005).
Second, although unemployment becomes more variable, the probability of job ¯nding
now varies less: the ratio ¾p=¾Q falls from 1.61 in the numerical benchmark to 1.40
with variable separation. This contradicts Shimer's (2005) calculation that job ¯nding
is almost as variable as unemployment. Third, the amount of variation in the separation
probability needed here is too large. The relative standard deviation of job destruction
to employment is now ¾D=¾N = 13:51, well above Cole and Rogerson's (1999) ¯gure of
six. (In the numerical benchmark, it is exactly one by construction.)
Lines 9 and 19 allow for variable search e®ort, ¯rst considering relatively inelastic
search (´h
S = 4) and then higher elasticity (´h
S = 2). Variable search e®ort makes
unemployment more cyclical because (as in Sec. 2) search rises when productivity is high.
With ´h
S = 4, we have ¾U=¾Q = 2:75, while ´h
S = 2 matches cyclical volatility quite well,
reaching ¾U=¾Q = 5:31. However, the responsiveness of unemployment to bene¯ts rises
even more, so that the key ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» falls. That is, as Props. 1 and 2 indicated,
endogenous search only makes the tradeo® worse. Also, su±ciently elastic search e®ort
again destroys the Beveridge curve: with ´h
S = 2, we have ½(U;V ) = ¡0:17.19
19Merz (1995) also ¯nds that variable search e®ort acts against the Beveridge curve.
215.3 Finite UI bene¯t duration
Another issue that might matter for our results is our assumption that UI bene¯ts
continue as long as unemployment lasts. Intuitively, UI bene¯ts might a®ect unemploy-
ment less if they eventually expired. The easiest way to model ¯nite bene¯t duration
is to assume bene¯ts expire with probability Á per period, implying expected duration
D ´ 1=Á. Then there are three labor market states: employed, unemployed with ben-
e¯ts, and unemployed without bene¯ts. The employed workers' Bellman equation (2)
is unchanged.20 Restricting ourselves to exogenous search e®ort, equation (3) for the
value of unemployment with bene¯ts is replaced by
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where W X(Z) is the value of unemployment without bene¯ts, given by
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Here, for the ¯rst time, we must distinguish the actual UI bene¯t b¡b0 (which expires at
rate Á) from the disutility of working b0. For consistency with the US, we set b¡b0 = 0:4.
We ¯rst consider a mean bene¯t duration of six months, which is the US norm.
Shorter UI duration increases the employment surplus §W = W E ¡W U (this is still the
relevant surplus for the Nash wage equation), so with b = 0:745 the cyclical volatility
of unemployment is greatly decreased. Therefore, in line 11 of Table 4 we also change
b to 0.87, which implies roughly the same surplus as in the benchmark of line 1. The
results are similar to those of the numerical benchmark: bene¯ts have a reasonable e®ect
on unemployment, but the cyclical variability of unemployment is much too small, so
the key ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» only increases from 0.7 in line 1 to 0.79 in line 11. In line
12, we instead assume bene¯ts last two years, which is the median duration reported
for European countries in LN99. This time we adjust b to 0.80 to keep the size of the
surplus in line with the benchmark model. Results are again similar.
Thus ¯nite bene¯t duration does not a®ect our main results. However, it does give
us an additional way to test the model, using LN99's estimate of the semielasticity of
20This assumes workers become eligible for UI from the moment of matching. Otherwise there would
be a fourth labor market state, employed without bene¯ts, with a lower outside option and thus lower
wages. As Coles and Masters (2005) point out, this would drive down wages of new jobs in recessions
(when more workers run out of bene¯ts), making unemployment even less volatile.
22unemployment with respect to bene¯t duration, ²U
D = 0:1.21 Since the cyclical variability
of unemployment is roughly 7, the ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
D should be around 70. Instead, the
¯nal column of lines 11 and 12 reports values of 7.33 and 11.27, respectively: ¾U=¾Q is
too small compared with the e®ect of duration on the unemployment rate. Thus consid-
ering ¯nite bene¯t duration reinforces our claim that the standard RBCM framework
understates cyclical volatility relative to the e®ects of policies.
5.4 Sticky wages
We have seen that higher b means higher percentage variation in the ¯rm's surplus over
the cycle, increasing the variability of hiring and unemployment. Another obvious way
to make the ¯rm's surplus volatile would be to impose some form of wage stickiness,
as has been advocated recently by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005A,B). Furthermore, it
seems natural to assume that sticky wages are only a short run phenomenon, so that
they should have minimal in°uence on the long run impact of the UI bene¯t.
Again, we choose an easy ad hoc way of making wages sticky. We assume that work-
ers' bargaining power varies negatively with the technology shock, so that workers get
a larger share of surplus in recessions. This stabilizes the wage over the cycle, and thus
destabilizes the ¯rm's hiring incentives. In line 13 we assume that the worker's bar-
gaining power increases (decreases) by 15% when the aggregate technology shock is low
(high). This raises ¾U=¾Q to 5.67, roughly consistent with the data. The semielasticity
²U
» hardly changes, so that (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» increases to 2.73.
This does not seem like an unreasonable degree of wage stickiness: the ratio of the
standard deviations of log wages and log output is now ¾w=¾Q = 0:59. This is better
than the ¯gure of 0.91 in the baseline model, though still not as low as in the data;
for example, Merz (1995) reports ¾w=¾Q = 0:37 for the US. Therefore, sticky wages
seem a potentially promising way of improving the model's ¯t. But obviously they are
controversial, and debate goes on about possible justi¯cations for wage stickiness.
One possible microfoundation for wage stickiness is an \e±ciency wage". Here, if we
follow Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) by assuming a constant probability of catching shirk-
ers, ¯rms should o®er workers a constant surplus just su±cient to prevent shirking.22
21See their Table 15. Here we refer to LN99's estimate because their duration variable, the number
of years bene¯ts last, can be interpreted as D = 1=Á in our model. Our own duration regressor is the
fraction of bene¯ts remaining after the ¯rst year, which is harder to interpret in terms of (30)-(31). But
since it is insigni¯cant in our regressions, the conclusion remains that UI duration has stronger e®ects
in the model than in the data.
22Costain and Jansen (2006) provide a more complete analysis of the cyclical dynamics of a matching
model with e±ciency wages.
23Thus in line 14 we report a version of our model where the Nash bargaining condition
(8) is replaced by an equation that ¯xes a constant surplus for the worker at all times
(equal to the average surplus in the numerical benchmark of line 1). While cyclical
unemployment volatility rises, the semielasticity of U with respect to » increases even
more, so that (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» falls to 0.64. The problem is that the possibility of shirking
alters wages not only in the short run, but also in the long run. Imposing a constant
surplus for the worker makes hiring incentives fall sharply with the replacement ratio,
so that our e±ciency wage model ¯ts less well than our ad hoc sticky wage model, in
which wages adjust °exibly to long run changes in UI.
5.5 Cohort-speci¯c technology shocks
Finally, we show that a form of embodied technological change could also help solve the
puzzle that concerns us. If it is cheaper to start using a new technology by hiring new
workers with di®erent skills instead of retraining existing employees, then technology
shocks should a®ect new matches without changing the productivity of old ones.23 One
reason to prefer such a speci¯cation is that, in contrast to the model of Sec. 3, it makes
wages of new hires more procyclical than those of continuing jobs. This is a well-
established empirical fact (see for example Bils 1985 and Bowlus 1995). There is also
direct evidence that workers ¯nd higher-quality jobs in booms than in recessions, from
data on movements across sectors (Heckman and Sedlacek 1985), job tenure (Bowlus
1995), and worker and job characteristics (Devereux 2003). Again, this suggests that
productivity should have a match-speci¯c or cohort-speci¯c component.
So we next set ®Z = 0, making the productivity of each match speci¯c to its time of
creation. Since shocks no longer a®ect all matches equally, the persistence of aggregate
output increases, so we decrease the persistence parameter ¹ ½Z from 0.67 to 0.6 annually.
We also initially set ³ = 1, so that the cohort-speci¯c shock has the same impact as the
aggregate shock did; and we lower b slightly to 0.7, to keep ²U
» near its target level of
two. This simple change of speci¯cation, called the \cohort-speci¯c benchmark" in the
table, more than su±ces to reconcile cyclical unemployment volatility with the e®ect of
policy on unemployment. In line 15, we ¯nd that ¾U=¾Q = 9:66, even higher than in the
data, while ²U
» = 1:79 is slightly decreased, so that the ratio (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» rises to 5.40.24
The job ¯nding probability also varies more: ¾p=¾Q = 11:32.
23Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005B) study trend growth
in models where employers can implement new technology by retraining or by rehiring.
24Since °uctuations are more persistent under this speci¯cation, the results are now more sensitive to
the HP ¯lter. Without ¯ltering, we have ¾U=¾Q = 7:86 instead of 9.66, but this still su±ces to match
the data.
24Why does this cohort-speci¯c productivity speci¯cation increase cyclical volatility so
much? Note that when technology shocks are disembodied (®Z = 1) and thus immedi-
ately a®ect all matches, workers and ¯rms know that a high match productivity Z may
fall before separation, and a low Z may rise. In contrast, in the embodied (®Z = 0)
case, a match's productivity z will be unchanged until separation; other things equal,
this increases the di®erence in value between high and low productivity matches, making
hiring respond more strongly to the aggregate state. Also, since employment now varies
more relative to output, and high and low productivity matches coexist, we now ¯nd
that aggregate productivity varies less relative to output than it did with disembodied
productivity: ¾y=¾Q falls from 0.92 in the model of line 1 to 0.54 in the cohort-speci¯c
benchmark of line 15. This also improves the model's ¯t, though it goes somewhat too
far, overshooting the ratio ¾y=¾Q = 0:65 we calculate from the FRED data.
A potential problem with the embodied technology speci¯cation is that wages become
much more volatile: ¾w=¾Q more than triples from its benchmark value in line 1, which
is already too high. The reason is that even though a technological improvement leaves
the productivity of existing matches unchanged, it nonetheless raises all workers' outside
options, and thereby their wages. We should emphasize here that matching models do
not actually tie down the wage process. These models only specify how the surplus
is split between the ¯rm and worker, and more than one wage process (including, for
example, implicit contracts that keep the wages of existing matches ¯xed) is consistent
with the implied behavior of the surplus.25 Therefore we may not want to reject this
model on the basis of its wage implications. However, those who wish to take wage data
literally may prefer the sticky wage model of line 13.
Since assuming entirely embodied technology exaggerates unemployment °uctua-
tions and also understates aggregate productivity °uctuations, we can now a®ord to
go to the intermediate case ®Z = 0:5, so that technology shocks have both aggregate
and cohort-speci¯c e®ects. To do well on both these margins simultaneously, it is also
helpful to raise ³ to 1.6, making embodied technology shocks 60% stronger than disem-
bodied shocks. This parameterization is shown in line 16, with labor market cyclicality
(¾U=¾Q = 5:36) and policy e®ects (²U
» = 1:77) both close to the data.
Finally, since output di®ers across matches, it now seems especially important to
consider variable separation. Thus in line 17 we vary the separation rate by §10% with
the match-speci¯c shock z: that is, we assume less productive matches are always more
25Two papers exploring implicit contracts are Rudanko (2005) and Reiter (2006), which studies our
embodied technology speci¯cation in greater depth. In both papers, aggregate wages become even
smoother than they are in US data.
25likely to separate. This speci¯cation yields our most successful simulation. The ratio
¾U=¾Q rises to 6.43, and the semielasticity of unemployment with respect to the replace-
ment ratio » is nearly unchanged at ²U
» = 1:80, so that (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» = 3:58 is consistent
with the data. While line 8 showed that generating labor market volatility through
variable separation alone reverses the sign of the Beveridge correlation, combining vari-
able separation with another source of labor market volatility only mildly reduces the
correlation between unemployment and vacancies, to -0.60. This version of the model
is also fairly successful with the volatility of labor productivity: ¾y=¾Q equals 0.60 in
our model and 0.65 in our data; the job ¯nding probability: ¾p equals 10.5 in our model
and 11.8 in the data of Shimer (2005); and job destruction: ¾JD=¾N equals 3.36 in our
model and 6.57 in the data of Cole and Rogerson (1999). The biggest problem with this
speci¯cation is again excessive wage variability, ¾w=¾Q = 2:43.
6 Matching in business cycle models with capital
We have argued that our model's lack of physical capital is probably inessential for
our results. But to be sure, we ¯nish by reexamining the models of Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996), which include capital. While these papers reported some success
in modeling labor market °uctuations, when we recalculate their steady states to mea-
sure the e®ects of UI bene¯ts, we ¯nd that they su®er from the same problem as our
benchmark model: insu±cient cyclical volatility compared with the impact of policy.
6.1 The model of Andolfatto (1996)
To understand both models it is helpful to start by looking at the surplus. In Andol-
fatto's case, we calculate that the match surplus is equal to only 17.3% of mean quarterly
labor productivity| much lower than that of our numerical benchmark.26 This suggests
that his labor market should be quite volatile.
At ¯rst glance, Andolfatto's labor market appears to work well. His Table 1 shows
that employment is 0.51 times as variable as output in his model, compared with 0.67 in
his data. However, this hides a surprising failure to explain unemployment, because of
an unusual calibration. Andolfatto sets the mean employment rate to 57%, so that the
mean unemployment rate is 43%, thus treating any nonworking person over age 16 as
26In Andolfatto's notation, from qJ = · and J = ®§ we get the total surplus as § = ·=(q®) =
0:105=(0:9 ¤ 0:6) = 0:194 in units of quarterly output. (This equals ¹, the shadow value of a match,
divided by the marginal utility of consumption.) Labor productivity is (1¡µ)y=n = 0:64=0:57 = 1:123,
so match surplus is 0.194/1.123=17.3% of quarterly productivity.
26unemployed. This goes far beyond some authors, such as Cole and Rogerson (1999) and
den Haan et. al. (2000), who have argued for a broader de¯nition of unemployment, by
including all pensioners, students, and homemakers as inputs to the matching function.
Any given standard deviation of log employment therefore corresponds to a smaller
standard deviation of log unemployment in Andolfatto's calibration than it would if













0:51 = 0:68 (32)
less than one tenth of the volatility we calculate from US data, based on the standard
de¯nition of unemployment.
Furthermore, even if we choose to ignore unemployment, Andolfatto's model also
understates the volatility of other labor market variables. The coe±cient of variation
of vacancies in his model is about 4.4%, so that ¾V=¾Q = 3:2, compared to 9 in his
data. Since unemployment hardly varies, the coe±cient of variation of tightness is only
slightly higher (4.6%), compared with 37% in our data. Using 1 ¡¸ = 0:6, workers' job
¯nding probability has coe±cient of variation 0:6 ¤ 4:6% = 2:8% in Andolfatto's model,
about one fourth of the volatility Shimer (2005) ¯nds in US data.
Andolfatto's model has no UI bene¯ts, but in his setup they would be equivalent to
work disutility. Thus, to mimic a one percentage point increase in the UI replacement
ratio, we raise the utility of the nonemployed by one percent of mean labor productivity,
scaled by the marginal utility of consumption. We calculate that the semielasticity of
unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio is 2.41 in Andolfatto's model, which
might seem consistent with our cross-country estimate. But it is not: given Andolfatto's
interpretation of unemployment, each 1% increase in logU represents a 0.43 percentage
point increase in unemployment. That is, a one percentage point rise in the replacement
ratio increases unemployment by 2.41*0.43=1.04 percentage points, whereas Layard et.
al. (1991) estimate that this coe±cient is 0.17.27 Seen in this way, Andolfatto's labor
market both behaves too smoothly over the business cycle, and overreacts to UI; the
punchline for his paper is (¾U=¾Q)=²U
» = 0:68
2:41 = 0:28.
6.2 The model of Merz (1995)
Merz (1995) comes close to ¯tting the variability of unemployment and the job ¯nding
probability in US data. With her benchmark speci¯cation, ¾U=¾Q = 4:77,28 and ¾p=¾Q =
27Here, for comparability, we refer to a slope estimate instead of a semielasticity estimate.
28This is the result of our own calculation and di®ers slightly from the number in Merz' Table 2.
275:41. However, if we back out the e®ect of UI in the same way we did for Andolfatto, we
¯nd that the model exaggerates the sensitivity of unemployment to bene¯ts. yielding






is therefore 0.73, so Merz' model fails by
roughly the same factor as our benchmark model in Section 4.1.
When we calculate the match surplus in Merz' model, it turns out to be only 1.69
percent of mean quarterly labor productivity| ¯ve times smaller than anything we have
seen so far. Thus Merz achieves su±cient cyclical volatility only by assuming an almost
negligible surplus, and in doing so exaggerates the response to UI bene¯ts.
The reason Merz' labor market °uctuates so little, in relation to the tiny surplus she
assumes, is that she de¯nes the surplus di®erently from all the other models we have
discussed. Most matching models assume that the marginal disutility of work is constant
along the extensive margin (increases in employment) even if it is increasing along the
intensive margin (increasing marginal disutility in hours per job, as in Andolfatto's
model). In contrast, in Merz' paper the surplus accrues to a family with a continuum of
members, with increasing marginal disutility of work as more family members ¯nd jobs.
At the margin, the disutility from one more job almost equals the wage income from
that job, so the surplus is extremely small. To us, the usual formulation seems more
appropriate, since typical households contain only one or two earners, each of whom
may have a large inframarginal gain when they ¯nd a job.
6.3 Other models with capital
Den Haan et. al. (2000) study an RBCM model with endogenous separations. They
are successful in explaining variations in job creation and destruction, and ¯nd that the
interaction between job destruction and investment helps amplify shocks. This is con-
sistent with our ¯nding that variable separation can make matching volatile. However,
our calculations suggest that their model will fail to generate a Beveridge curve. Their
paper does not report the correlation between vacancies and unemployment.29
Gomes et. al. (2001) simulate a business cycle model in which individuals search for
jobs. It is not an RBCM model, because it has no matching function. Instead, it has an
exogenous distribution of job o®ers, making it a dynamic extension of McCall's (1970)
partial equilibrium search model. They successfully reproduce the cyclical °uctuations
of unemployment. However, they state that raising the replacement ratio from 0.5 to 0.7
increases unemployment from 6.1% to 13.9%, which is a semielasticity of 6.49, exceeding
our estimate by a factor of three. Thus their model su®ers from the same problem as
the RBCM models we have addressed.
29Fujita (2003) explores ways of extending the den Haan et. al. model to generate a Beveridge curve.
287 Conclusions
A model of real business cycles and matching implies that job creation depends on
the surplus available to the matched pair. Procyclical employment °uctuations occur if
surplus rises in booms, and increased unemployment bene¯ts drive down employment by
decreasing the surplus. The standard RBCM model implies a close relationship between
these two aspects of employment variability, which is strongly at odds with data. To
¯t business cycle data, the surplus must be small enough so that productivity shocks
have a big e®ect on vacancies; but to reproduce the observed e®ects of policies, the
surplus must be large enough so that UI bene¯ts have a small e®ect on vacancies. We
have shown analytically that these two requirements cannot be reconciled in a baseline
version of the model. We have shown numerically that this result is robust to endogenous
search, endogenous separation, ¯nite bene¯t duration, and e±ciency wages; we have also
argued that capital, variable bene¯ts, and variable hiring costs are unlikely to resolve
the puzzle; and we have argued that the HP ¯lter is not crucial for our results.
Match-embodied technological change can help reconcile these two implications of
the model (see also Hornstein et. al. 2005), because it makes the surplus accruing to
the ¯rm substantially more procyclical, so that hiring, unemployment, and the worker's
job-¯nding probability all °uctuate more. Sticky wages have a similar e®ect on the
¯rm's surplus, so they also help increase cyclical variability without exaggerating the
impact of labor market policy (see also Shimer 2004; Hall 2005B; Gertler and Trigari
2005; Menzio 2005).
Our ¯ndings suggest that modeling labor market °uctuations by calibrating a very
small match surplus, as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) advocate, is unhelpful because
it is inconsistent with robust observations about the e®ects of labor market policy. There
is endless scope for debating cross-country regressions, but we ¯nd that the small surplus
calibration must take us far from any available evidence on policy e®ects in order to
reproduce cyclical °uctuations. While sticky wages or embodied productivity shocks
may prove to be fruitful explanations of labor market dynamics, many other ways of
improving the ¯t of the matching model have also been suggested recently, including
alternative speci¯cations of the bargaining game, hiring and training costs, and shocks to
job destruction (Hall and Milgrom 2005; Silva and Toledo 2005; Mortensen and Nagyp¶ al
2006). In the long run we believe economists will learn a lot about the labor market and
business cycles by asking which of these alternatives are consistent with a wide range
of empirical facts. More generally, we believe policy studies are often likely to be useful
in testing business cycle models: measuring the impact of observable policy shocks may
impose useful discipline on business cycle models where the shocks might otherwise have
29to be treated as unobservables. This sort of discipline seems especially important if the
models in question are intended for use in policy analysis.
Appendix 1: Linearized dynamics
First we linearize the zero pro¯t condition (18) and the dynamics of the surplus (17):
¸~ µt ¡ ~ St = ¸









S ~ St (34)
These equations can be simpli¯ed by writing ~ pt and ~ St in terms of ~ µt and Et~ §t+1,
as follows: ~ pt = (1 ¡ ¸¤)~ µt, and ~ St = ´S
µ ~ µt, and ~ µt = 1
¸¤Et~ §t+1. The following matrix























































. We assume search
is su±ciently inelastic so that the second eigenvalue is greater than one (this is auto-
matically true if search is exogenous).30 Thus the system is saddle-path stable, and
has a unique equilibrium. The eigenvector associated with the stable eigenvalue can be























y ¡ b ¡ ¿ + h
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1 ¡ ¯ + ¯± + ¯¹p





Saddle path stability implies that x is the elasticity ~ §t=~ yt. Thus, in terms of the
observable variable ~ p, we have:
~ pt = (1 ¡ ¸
¤)~ µt =
1 ¡ ¸¤
¸¤ Et~ §t+1 =
1 ¡ ¸¤
¸¤ ½x~ yt (38)
Again we see that su±ciently inelastic search (¸¤ > 0) is essential for matching the data:
(38) shows that the job ¯nding probability is decreasing in productivity if ¸¤ < 0.
30We assume periods are short enough so that p is small, which means this eigenvalue is positive.
30Now using formula (37) for x, we obtain equation (26), which is used to derive Prop.
1. For Prop. 2, we linearize the dynamics (28) of unemployment:




















so the dynamics of U become ~ Ut+1 = A~ Ut ¡ B~ yt, where we de¯ne A ´ (U ¡ ±)=U and
B ´ ±((1 ¡ U)(1 ¡ ¸¤)=(U¸¤))½x. This implies:
Var(~ Ut) =
B2(1 + ½A)














±(U + ½(U ¡ ±))
(2U ¡ ±)(U + ½(± ¡ U))
(42)
This equation, together with the formula (37) for x, and the formula (23) for the steady
state comparative statics, gives us Proposition 2.
Appendix 2: Data
Data sources. We study two data sets. First, we obtained the Labor Market Insti-
tutions Database (LMIDB), compiled by Steven Nickell and Luca Nunziata, from the
webpage of the Centre for Economic Performance (it is an appendix to CEP Discussion
Paper #502). The LMIDB database is constructed from OECD data on institutional
and labor market characteristics of 20 countries for 1960-94.
Our second dataset includes extensions of the LMIDB database added ¯rst by the
IMF and then by Baker, Glyn, Howard, and Schmitt (BGHS). This dataset, available
on the webpage of John Schmitt at the CEPR, extends most series to 1999 and includes
some additional or alternative variables. When the BGHS data we need only exist up
to 1997 or 1998, we extend the data to 1999 using the last available value.
Sample. The LMIDB and BGHS data sets include annual data from 1960 to 1994
and 1999, respectively, for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany (including East from 1989 on), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
31Before running our regressions, we average each variable, for each country, over ¯ve-
year periods from 1960-64 to 1995-99. We exclude Portugal because of missing data, so
in most regressions our panel contains 19 countries and 8 time periods.
Variable de¯nitions. Except where stated otherwise, the following variables are iden-
tical to those in Nickell and Nunziata (2001), which can be consulted for further details.
Log unemployment rate. To construct our dependent variable, we ¯rst average the
unemployment rate over 5-year periods, and then take the log.
Tax wedge. This is the sum of three tax rates: employers' contributions as a fraction
of payments to labor, plus direct taxes as a fraction of household income, plus indirect
taxes as a fraction of private expenditures. In our regressions we multiply this fraction
by 100 to convert it to a percentage, for comparability with LN99, Table 15.
UI bene¯t replacement ratio. Initial UI bene¯ts as a fraction of gross wage income.
We multiply it by 100 to convert it to a percentage, for comparability with LN99. In
some regressions, instead of including the tax wedge and UI bene¯t replacement ratio
separately, we include their sum.
Bene¯t duration. This expresses UI bene¯ts after the ¯rst year as a fraction of initial
bene¯ts b. If b23 is the bene¯t level in the second and third years of unemployment, and
b45 is the level in the fourth and ¯fth years, bene¯t duration is b¡1(0:6b23 + 0:4b45).
Employment protection. This is an index of the extent of legal impediments to ¯ring,
taking values from 0 (weak employment protection laws) to 2 (strong). We multiply it
by 10 so that it is an index from 0 to 20, as in LN99.
Union density. This is the fraction of workers who are union members. We multiply it
by 100 to convert it to a percentage, as in LN99.
Bargaining coordination. This is an index representing the extent to which wage bar-
gaining is coordinated at a nationwide level, taking values from 0 (no coordination) to
3. We multiply it by 2, making it an index from 0 to 6, as in LN99.
Owner occupancy rate. This represents the fraction of households who own their homes.
We multiply it by 100 to convert it to a percentage, as in LN99.
Active labor market policies (ALMP). This variable, available in the BGHS data but
not the LMIDB, represents the fraction of GDP, per unemployed worker, spent by the
government on job training and job matching. Since dividing by the unemployment rate
causes an endogeneity problem, we also construct an instrument in which the fraction
of GDP spent on ALMP is divided by the unemployment rate in the previous ¯ve-year
period. ALMP is only available from 1985 to 1999, with some missing values which we
have ¯lled in by interpolation.
Mean output gap. This variable, available in the BGHS data but not the LMIDB, is
an OECD estimate of the output gap as a fraction of GDP (positive when output is
32above potential). We never use this as a country-speci¯c variable; instead, we include
its (unweighted) cross-country mean as an alternative to including time dummies.
Web page. Our data ¯les can be downloaded from the following web page:
http://www.econ.upf.es/»costain/rbcmatch/webpage/bcui.html
This page also includes step-by-step information about the construction of our data set,
STATA commands for running our regressions, and many regression results.
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